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"FEDERAL QUESTION" JURISDICTION-
A SNARE AND A DELUSION 
Ernest ]. London* 
P OORLY defined criteria in the area of jurisdiction are espe-cially wasteful, generating as they often do expensive and pro-
tracted litigation over threshold issues, rather than promoting the 
speedy determination of lawsuits on their merits. One of the 
most perplexing exercises in American law practice is the effort 
to define with certainty the original jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts1 in matters where there is no diversity of citizen-
ship. 2 Although this general head of federal jurisdiction has 
persistently and pervasively been characterized as "federal ques-
tion" jurisdiction, it is doubtful whether there is, in fact, original 
jurisdiction in the lower federal courts over federal questions, 
as such. This use of an inappropriate and misleading jurisdictional 
standard has been, and will continue to be, the source of a lack 
of coherence in the decided cases and uncertainty in the minds of 
those who must make the choice of a proper forum in which 
to plead, and it is the purpose of this article both to illustrate 
the unsuitability of the "federal question" criterion as a test 
for the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts in non-
diversity matters and to suggest the orientation for a redefinition 
of this subject matter. 
I. The Constitutional and Statutory Provisions 
Article III of the Constitution established the national judi-
cial power over all cases arising under the Constitution, laws and 
treaties of the United States, as well as over controversies between 
citizens of different states, and it vested that power in the Supreme 
• LL.B., Harvard, 1951; member, Florida Bar.-:Ed. 
1 The expression "lower federal courts" is here used to refer to the United States 
district courts and to the former circuit courts of the United States when those courts had 
nisi prius jurisdiction. 
2 Cf. Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions," 90 UNIV. 
PA. L. REv. 639 (1942); Forrester, "The Nature of a 'Federal Question,'" 16 TULANE L. 
REv. 362 (1942); Forrester, "Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5,'' 18 TULANE 
L. REv. 263 (1943); Bergman, "Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction,'' 46 MICH. 
L. REv. 17 (1947); Fraser, "Some Problems in Federal Question Jurisdiction,'' 49 MICH. 
L. REv. 73 (1950); Mishkin, "The Federal 'Question' in the District Courts,'' 53 CoL. L. 
REv. 157 (1953). 
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Court and in such inferior courts as Congress might from time 
to time create. Except, however, for the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court as enumera:red in Article III, the extent to 
which this constitutional grant of judicial power would be 
exercised, particularly with respect to the type and number of 
inferior courts and the scope of their jurisdiction, was left to 
the discretion of Congress.3 That discretion was first exercised 
by Congress in 1789 to establish a system of national nisi prius 
courts,4 but only part of the available constitutional jurisdiction 
was conferred on those courts at that time. Although the first 
Judiciary Act extended to the lower federal courts original juris-
diction over controversies between citizens of different states, no 
provision was made therein for original jurisdiction over cases 
arising under the laws of the national government. This was not 
an oversight but reflected a compromise made necessary by the 
determined opposition of the antifederalists to a national judi-
ciary, 5 and it was not until the Judiciary Act of 1875 that Congress 
provided generally for the original jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts in cases arising under national law.6 In thus providing for 
this head of federal jurisdiction in the Act of 1875, Congress 
borrowed substantially the same phrasing which had been used 
in Article III of the Constitution to describe the national judicial 
power, extending the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts 
to cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States.7 
3 See Carey v. Curtis, 3 How. (44 U.S.) 236 at 245 (1845); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. (49 
U.S.) 441 at 448-449 (1850); Kline v. Burke Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226 at 233-234 (1922). 
4 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73. 
5 See Warren, "New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789," 37 
HARV. L. REv. 49 at 53, 65 et seq., 125 et seq. (1923); Friendly, "The Historic Basis of 
Diversity Jurisdiction," 41 HARv. L. REv. 483 (1928); FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE 
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 11 (1928). The willingness to accept federal jurisdiction 
with respect to diversity matters, on the other hand, has been explained by the desire 
of the powerful commercial interests to provide impartial tribunals for the protection 
of litigants from other states and foreign countries against parochial prejudice. FRANK-
FURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 8-9 (1928). 
6 18 Stat. 470 (1875). For a discussion of and reference to the largely unsatisfactory 
legislative history and contemporary comment on the passage of this act, see Chadbourn 
and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions," 90 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 639 at 
642-645 (1942); FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65, note 
34 (1928). 
7 18 Stat. 470 (1875): "[I']he circuit courts of the United States shall have original 
cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature 
at common law or in equity ••• arising under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. • • ." 
The present statutory language is substantially the same [28 U.S.C. (1952) §1331]: 
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In two historic decisions, antedating the Act of 1875, Chief 
Justice Marshall had already broadly construed the constitutional 
language. In Cohens v. Virginia8 he had declared that a case 
arose under the Constitution and laws of the United States, 
within the sense of Article III of the Constitution, whenever its 
correct decision depended upon the construction of either.9 In 
Osborn v. Bank of United Stat:es10 he declared that whenever 
a question of the construction of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States formed an "ingredient" of a case, Congress had 
the power to give to the lower federal courts jurisdiction over such 
a case, although the decision of the case might not actually depend 
upon such a question.11 In these two pioneer cases Chief Justice 
Marshall was confronted with the task of outlining a legal frame-
work for the young republic and providing sufficient flexibility 
and latitude within that framework for the growth and develop-
ment which he wisely anticipated.12 The "federal question" con-
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the matter 
in controversy ... arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 
In the subsequent discussion, when the context permits, reference to "the statutory 
provision" or to "the jurisdictional statute" shall include each of the congressional re-
enactments of the Act of 1875, throughout which the phrasing of the Act of 1875 has 
been substantially preserved. 
s 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 (1821). 
9 In Cohens v. Virginia the appellants had -been convicted in a lower court of the 
State of Virginia of selling lottery tickets in violation of Virginia law. The appellants 
contended that the sale of the lottery tickets had been authorized by an Act of Congress, 
which was a bar to prosecution by the state authorities. The Supreme Court of Virginia 
upheld the conviction, and the appellants sought to remove the case to the Supreme 
Court for review. Holding that the Supreme Court of the United States had the power 
to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall stated 
that it was a case which arose under the Constitution and laws of the United States 
because its correct decision depended upon a determination of whether, under the Con-
stitution, national law superseded conflicting state law. 
10 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 (1824). 
11 In Osborn v. Bank of United States Congress had incorporated the Bank of the 
United States and given to it the power to sue and be sued in the state and federal 
courts. Reading this as an express congressional grant of jurisdiction to the lower federal 
courts over all cases in which the Bank was a party (see note 38 infra), Chief Justice 
Mars~ll then decided that Congress had the power under Article III of the Constitu-
tion to confer such jurisdiction. The Bank, he pointed out, was a creature of federal 
law, and each of its actions potentially involved questions of federal law, such as the 
power to sue, to contract, etc. This was a sufficient "ingredient" of federal law to justify 
a congressional grant of federal jurisdiction over all cases in which the Bank was a party. 
12 The successful functioning of the federal system required that the Supreme Court 
have the constitutional power to act as the ultimate arbiter on all federal questions to 
resolve the sovereignty conflicts which must inevitably arise among the various state and 
lower federal courts, as well as the separate and independent ,branches of government. 
Cf. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 29 (1958). Cohens v. Virginia served that need. Moreover, 
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cept was admirably adapted to these organic law needs, 13 whereas 
such a broad construction of the jurisdictional statute was not 
similarly required. Jurisdictional legislation can easily be accom-
modated to changing needs, as contrasted with the difficulty of 
amending the Constitution, and as long as the state courts were 
at all times available as forums to try matters which had been 
excluded from the cognizance of the federal courts-and had 
been largely relied upon for that purpose, apparently satisfactorily, 
up until the Act of 187514-the jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts could always be expanded on an ad hoc basis if, in any 
,particular instance, national interests were discovered to be 
prejudiced by a restrictive construction of the jurisdictional 
statute.15 Notwithstanding the foregoing differences in context 
and function between the constitutional and the statutory pro-
visions, Chief Justice Marshall's exposition of the constitutional 
phrasing in Cohens v. Virginia and Osborn v. Bank of United 
States was at first thought to control the meaning of the similar 
phrasing in the Act of 1875, and the pervasive use of the "federal 
question" rubric to describe the jurisdiction created by the Act 
of 1875 has its origins in the early uncritical transfer to the 
jurisdictional statute of Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncements 
in the cases construing Article III of the Constitution.16 
There were at the same time, however, formidable practical 
and political considerations militating against the a_ctual imple-
the vindication of national policies in those instances where state courts might be either 
antagonistic or not properly equipped to cope -with the special nature of the problems 
involved required that Congress have the constitutional power to confer jurisdiction on 
the lower federal courts in selected matters. Cf. Mishkin, "The Federal 'Question' in the 
District Courts," 53 CoL. L. R.Ev. 157 at 157-160 (1953). Osborn v. Bank of United States 
served that need. 
13 It was a sufficiently plastic concept to fit almost any future contingency. See note 
17 infra, a_nd discussion in text at notes 87-92. 
14 See -M'Intire v. Wood, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.) 504 (1813). 
15 See Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions,'' 90 UNIV. 
PA. L. R.Ev. 639 at '?42, 649 (1942); Bergman, "Federal Question Jurisdiction," 46 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 17 at 18-19 (1947). 
16 For a classic example of such a transfer, see quotation from Starin v. New York, 
115 U.S. 248 at 257 (1885), reproduced in note 64 infra. Cf. discussion in text at notes 
30-31; Mishkin, "The Federal 'Question' in the District Courts," 53 CoL. L. R.Ev. 157 at 
170-171 (1953). For a latex: recognition that such identity of phrasing does not require 
identity of interpretation, compare concurring opinion of Justice Rutledge in National 
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 at 613-614 (1949); Shulman 
and Jaegerman, "Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure,'' 45 YALE L. J. 
393 at 405, note 47 (1936). 
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mentation of such a transfer. Because there is a federal question 
"lurking" in the background of almost every controversy,17 if 
the jurisdictional statute were to be given a construction coex-
tensive with the construction which Chief Justice Marshall had 
already given to the similar phrasing in Article III of the Con-
stitution, access to the lower federal courts would then have been 
virtually unrestricted.18 The national system of courts, however, 
has chronically suffered from the threat of paralysis through 
glut,19 and the Supreme Court would understandably be reluctant 
to give to the Act of 187 5 a construction which would have pro-
duced an oppressive increase in the case load of the lower federal 
courts, and, in turn, have fed a correspondingly larger volume 
of cases into the Supreme Court.20 There were, moreover, com-
17 See Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 at ll8 (1936): "If we follow the 
ascent far enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to have their source or 
their operative limits in the provision of a federal statute or in the Constitution itself 
with its circumambient restrictions upon legislative power." Cf. Murdock v. Memphis, 
20 Wall. (87 U.S.) 590 at 629 (1875): "[A]nd it follows that there is no conceivable case 
so insignificant in amount or unimportant in principle that a perverse and obstinate 
man may not bring it to this court by the aid of a sagacious lawyer raising a Federal 
question in the record .... " Also see dissenting opinion of Justice Johnson in Osborn v. 
Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 at 889 (1824). Although the Act of 1875 
seems to have attempted to guard against such a risk by providing in §5 thereof that 
the circuit court shall dismiss or remand any suit if it shall appear "at any time after 
such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really or sub-
stantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said 
circuit court," it has been suggested that this section of the act has for the most part been 
disregarded by the Supreme Court. See Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction 
of Federal Questions," 90 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 639 at 652-658 (1942). In any event, §5 has 
not been included in the present statutory provision. See ·Reviser's Note, 28 U.S.C. (1952) 
§1359. 
18See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 65 (1928). The 
authors were under the impression that the Act of 1875 gave to the federal courts "the 
vast range of power which had lain dormant in the Constitution since 1789." However, 
as will be illustrated in some detail hereinafter, the Supreme Court has given a much 
narrower construction to that legislation, a result later alluded to by Justice Frankfurter 
in his opinion in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 at 673 (1950). 
See note 20 infra. 
19 See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 22-23, 69-70, 
272, 300 (1928); Shafroth, "Report of Administrative Office Shows Federal Court Dockets 
Still Congested," 44 A.B.A.J. 551 (1958) (summary of Report of Administrative Office of 
United States Courts for fiscal year 1957). 
20 See Frankfurter, "Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State 
Courts," 13 CoRN. L. Q. 499 at 503-506 (1928). The extent to which the Supreme Court 
is overworked was commented upon in a recent address delivered on October 9, 1958 
before the State Bar of California at Coronada, California by Dean Erwin N. Griswold of 
Harvard Law School (as reported in the October 16, 1958 issue of the HARVARD LAw 
REcoRD, Vol. 27, No. 4, p. 3:4): "The Court, and each of its members, have far too much 
to do, and have to work far .too hard and too fast, especially in view of the great com-
plexity and importance of the issues that come before it. . • . To an extent to which 
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pelling political reasons against such a construction. Reference 
has already been made to the apprehension felt in certain quarters 
that a strong national system of courts would weaken the state gov-
ernments. 21 The vast expansion of the original jurisdiction of the 
lower federal courts inherent in a construction of the jurisdictional 
statute giving to it as broad a scope as had already been given 
to Article III of the Constitution might well have been fatal to 
the peer status of the state courts, for it was fairly to be expected 
that much of their former business would then drift over to the 
federal courts. The disturbing effect that such a development 
would have had on federal-state relationships was not to be lightly 
countenanced,22 and to impute to Congress such a radical change 
of policy with respect to the distribution of power between 
the state and national governments ought to require far stronger 
evidence of congressional intent than was available.23 
The subsequent analysis of the Supreme Court's decisions 
construing and applying the jurisdictional statute can not be 
fully meaningful unless the conflicting impulses to which the 
Court was thus subjected are borne in mind. On the one hand 
was the natural tendency to give the same meaning in the juris-
I think the bar is largely unaware, the Supreme Court is now oppressed by mere volume 
and complexity of its business." 
An insight into the attitude of the Court itself was given in Tennessee v. Union &: 
Planter's Bank, 152 U.S. 454 at 462 (1894), where, in reviewing certain revisions of the 
jurisdictional acts, the Court stated: "The change is in accordance ,with the general 
policy of these acts, manifest upon their face, and often recognized by .this Court, to 
contract the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States." And in Skelly Oil Co. 
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 at 673 (1950), the Court, through Justice Frank-
furter, stated: "With exceptions not now relevant Congress has narrowed the opportunities 
for entrance into the federal courts, and this Court has been more careful than in earlier 
days in enforcing these jurisdictional limitations." 
Cf. Public Law 85-554, July 25, 1958, amending 28 U.S.C. (1952) §§1331 and 1332 
so as to increase the minimum jurisdictional amounts from $3,000 to $10,000. 
21 See note 5 supra. 
22See Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263 at 270 (1934): "Due regard for the rightful 
independence of state governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that 
they scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute 
has defined." 
For an illustration of contemporary concern over this same problem, see Report 
of Committee on Federal-State Relationships as Affected ·by Judicial Decisions, approved 
at Pasadena, California on August 23, 1958, .by the Conference of Chief Justices of State 
Supreme Courts, as published in .a special supplement to the October 23, 1958 issue of 
the HARVARD LAw RECORD, Vol. 27, No. 5. 
23 See Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions," 90 UNIV. 
PA. L. REv. 639 at 642-645 (1942), where it is suggested that the Act of 1875 may have 
been "sneak" legislation. 
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dictional statute to a case arising under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States as Chief Justice Marshall had already 
given to those words in Article III of the Constitution, a tendency 
which was formalized by the assumption in the early opinions that 
the cases construing the constitutional provision were apposite 
to the similar statutory language.24 On the other hand were the 
persuasive policy reasons for restricting access to the lower federal 
courts. It is not too surprising, therefore, to discover this conflict 
reflected by an element of ambivalence in many of the Court's 
opinions, where "meaningless formal tribute" was often paid to 
Chief Justice Marshall's pronouncements in Cohens v. Virginia 
and Osborn v. Bank of United States} while "essentially contra-
dictory doctrines" were used as the actual basis for the decisions.25 
The prevalence of paradoxes of this nature in the opinions con-
struing and applying the jurisdictional statute proved to be 
particularly disastrous on those occasions when the Court itself 
failed to read the earlier cases in depth and was itself misled 
into accepting and applying them on the basis of their superficial 
import.26 
II. The Restrictive Interpretation of the Jurisdictional Statute 
The first occasion for the Supreme Court to construe the Act 
of 1875 arose in Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes.21 The 
defendants, who were engaged in hydraulic mining of gold-bearing 
placer mines, title to which had been derived from the United 
States, had been depositing the debris from their mining oper-
ations in the channel of an adjacent river, and the plaintiff had 
brought suit in the state court to restrain this phase of their 
operations. The defendants attempted to remove the case to the 
United States circuit court, 28 alleging in their petition for removal 
24 See note 16 supra. 
25 See Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions," 90 UNIV. 
PA. L. R.Ev. 639 at 652 (1942). See discussion in text at notes 29-32, 43-58 infra. 
26 See discussion in text at notes 35-42, 49-54, 59-62, 76-94 infra. 
21 96 U.S. 199 (1878). 
28 Section 2 of the Act of 1875 authorized the removal of suits arising under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States. Although .this article is properly concerned 
only with the original jurisdiction of -the lower federal courts in non-diversity matters, 
the scope of such original jurisdiction under §I of the Act of 1875 was identical with 
the scope of the removal jurisdiction under §2 thereof. It is, accordingly, appropriate 
to consider, in analyzing the scope of the original jurisdiction under the Act of 1875, 
the cases construing §2. 
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that their right to work the mines had been conferred by Act 
of Congress and they could only exercise said right by using the 
adjacent river channel for depositing the debris from their opera-
tions. If they were prevented from doing so, they said, the mining 
rights which they had derived under the laws of the United 
States would then be rendered valueless. The gist of the petition 
for removal was, accordingly, that construction must be had of 
the mining laws of the United States under which the defendants 
claimed in order to determine if they were privileged to continue 
with their operations. It would seem that there should have been 
no doubt about the outcome of the case if Chief Justice Marshall's 
"federal question" criterion, as developed in Cohens v. Virginia20 
and in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,80 was to be equally 
applied to the jurisdictional statute. However, although the 
Court made a nominal obeisance to the authority of those cases-
thus, at the very first, establishing the precedent of assuming 
that those cases were apposite to the construction of the juris-
dictional statute-it declined to accept the responsibility for 
actually giving to the jurisdictional statute the broad scope which 
had been accorded to the constitutional provision, side-stepping 
that chore by taking refuge, instead, in what it considered to be 
~ pleading defect-the failure of the petition for removal to allege 
with sufficient particularity the nature of the federal right upon 
which the defendants relied.81 
The Court understandably dealt gingerly with its initial 
exposure to the Pandora's box of problems presented by the Act 
of 1875, and it was almost apologetic for its decision.82 When, 
however, it was confronted, some twenty-two years later, with a 
similar case in which federal jurisdiction was claimed because 
29 6 Wheat. (19 U.S.) 264 at 379 (1821): A case "may truly •be said to arise under 
the constitution or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision depends upon 
the construction of either." 
80 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 738 at 822 (1824): A case arises under the Constitution and 
laws of ·the United States when "the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated 
by one construction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by 
the opposite construction. . · . ." 
81 See Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions," 90 UNIV. 
PA. L. REv. 639 at 652 (1942). 
82 At 96 U.S. 204 (1878), the Court stated: "The act of 1875 has made some radical 
changes in the law regulating removals. Important questions of practice are likely to 
arise under it, which, until the statute has been longer in operation, it will not be easy 
to decide in advance .... Under these circumstances, the present case is not to be con-
sidered as conclusive upon any question except the one directly involved and decided." 
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mmmg rights derived from the United States were in issue, 
it dealt more confidently with the task of construing the scope of 
the Act of 1875. In Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter3 it was flatly 
held that there was no federal jurisdiction over an action to deter-
mine the right to a patent to mining lands derived under federal 
law. The Court explained that Congress had provided that adverse 
claims with respect to such mining rights should be determined by 
local laws and customs, when not in conflict with the federal 
law, and because the actual decision of the case might well turn 
on a question of local law or on an issue of fact, it was not a case 
which "necessarily" arose under the laws of the United States. 
Inasmuch as litigation involving United States placer mining 
rights and United States mining patents are just as pregnant with 
a potential federal question as would be the run-of-the-mill liti-
gation in which the Bank of the United States might be involved, 
it is clear that in Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes and 
Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter the Court had already made a 
significant exception to Chief Justice Marshall's declaration in 
Osborn v. Bank of United States that a case arose under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States whenever a federal 
question formed an "ingredient" of the original cause.34 And, 
indeed, for the first time, the Court in Shoshone Mining Co. v. 
Rutter openly acknowledged that the scope of the constitutional 
and statutory provisions was not necessarily the same.35 Between 
the times of the decisions in Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. 
Keyes and Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, however, the Court 
decided the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases,36 where, in constru-
ing the meaning of a c~se arising under the Constitution and 
laws of the United States as used in the Act of 1875, the Court 
reverted to the literal construction which Chief Justice Marshall 
had given to the constitutional phrasing in Osborn v. Bank of 
33 177 U.S. 505 (1900). 
34 See Mishkin, "The Federal 'Question' in the District Courts," 53 CoL. L. REv. 157 
at 161-163 (1953). 
35 177 U.S. 505 at 506 (1900): "Under these clauses Congress might doubtless provide 
that any controversy of a judicial nature arising in or growing out of the disposal of the 
public lands should be litigated only in the courts of the United States. The question, 
therefore, is not one of the power of Congress, but of its intent. It has so construed 
the judicial system of the United States that the great bulk of litigation respecting rights 
of property, although those rights may in their inception go back to some law of the 
United States, is in fact carried on in •the courts of the several States." 
36115 U.S. I (1885). 
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United States. The defendant railroads in the Pacific Railroad 
Removal Cases, upon being sued in various state courts on a 
land condemnation suit and assorted personal injury claims, 
sought to have their cases removed to the appropriate United 
States circuit courts on the ground that, since they were aU corpo-
rations deriving their charters from Acts of Congress, the suits 
against them were suits arising under the laws of the United 
States under the authority of Osborn v. Bank of United States. 
Considering itself to be bound by the latter decision, the Court 
sustained the contention of the railroads that all cases in which 
corporations chartered by the United States were parties were 
automatically cases arising under the laws of the United States 
within the meaning of the Act of 1875. Chief Justice Marshall, 
however, had not been concerned with the Act of 1875 in Osborn 
v. Bank of United States,37 and the portion of his opinion upon 
which the Court relied in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases was 
applicable only to whether Congress had power under Article 
III of the Constitution to confer jurisdiction upon the federal 
courts over all cases in which the Bank of the United States was 
a party. 38 The Court failed to note this difference between the 
two cases and the possibility of a variance in the scope of the con-
37 See note 11 supra. 
38 In Osborn v. Bank of United States the Court was actually confronted with two 
questions. (I) Did Congress intend, in the act chartering the Bank of the United States 
and authorizing it to sue and be sued in the state and federal courts, to confer original 
jurisdiction on the United States circuit courts over all cases in which -the Bank was a 
party? (2) If Congress so intended, did it have the power to confer such jurisdiction under 
the constitutional language extending the national judicial power to all cases arising 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States? Chief Justice Marshall answered 
both the statutory and the constitutional questions in the affirmative, but his "federal 
question" doctrine was not pertinent to his construction of the statutory predicate for 
federal jurisdiction and was developed only in connection with the constitutional provi-
sion. Inasmuch as ·the Court in the Pacific Railroad Removal cases did not rely upon the 
language of the acts chartering the railroads as the statutory predicate for federal 
jurisdiction, but purported, instead, to construe the new legislation of 1875 and to base 
its finding of federal jurisdiction upon that legislation only, it was construing a statutory 
provision which Chief Justice Marshall had not ruled upon. It was not, therefore, 
technically bound by the decision in Osborn v. Bank of United States, as it mistakenly 
thought that it was, and it could properly have held ·that Chief Justice Marshall's con-
stitutional exposition was not transferable to the jurisdictional statute. 
Chief Justice Marshall's position with respect to the statutory question was later 
abandoned by the Supreme Court in Bankers Trust Co. v. Texas &: Pacific Ry. Co., 241 
U.S. 295 (1916), where the .Court held that the language in the charter of a United 
States corporation authorizing such corporation to sue and be sued in the federal courts 
merely defined the power of the corporation to bring suits in courts of competent 
jurisdiction ,but did not in itself create such jurisdiction. 
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stitutional and the statutory provisions,39 a possibility which it 
was careful to point out only five years later in Shoshone Mining 
Co. v. Rutter. This has led to the conclusion that the decision in 
the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases was a "sport,''40 in which the 
Court was bemused by the identical language in the two pro-
visions. In any event, the decision was later expressly nullified by 
Congress,41 ·with the apparent concurrence and satisfaction of 
the Supreme Court.42 
The tendency implicit in Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. 
Keyes and Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter to narrow the scope of 
the "federal question" concept when applying it to the jurisdiction 
of the lower federal courts was developed further by the Court 
in three subsequent decisions, wherein federal jurisdiction was 
denied although there was a substantial and clearly defined federal 
question involved in each case.43 In Metcalf v. Watertown44 the 
plaintiff, as assignee of a federal court judgment, had sued on 
that judgment in the United States Circuit Court for the Western 
District of Wisconsin. The defendant answered that the action 
was barred by a Wisconsin I 0-year statute of limitation applicable 
to actions on federal court judgments and judgments of states 
other than Wisconsin, in rebuttal of which the plaintiff argued 
that because Wisconsin law provided a 20-year limitation for 
actions on Wisconsin judgments, the selective application of the 
shorter period of limitation to an action on a federal court judg-
ment would be contrary to the Constitution of the United States. 
The circuit court had disposed of the case on its merits, but on 
appeal the Supreme Court held that the case had to be dismissed 
for lack of federal jurisdiction, declaring that in order to predi-
cate jurisdiction on the Act of 1875, it should appear at the out-
set, from the declaration or bill of the parties suing, that a question 
of a federal nature was involved, whereas whatever federal ques-
39 Only Chief Justice Waite, joined by Justice Miller, dissented, pointing out that 
the identical phrasing did not have the same broad meaning when used in the statute 
as it did when used in the Constitution. 
40 Mishkin, "The Federal 'Question' in the District Courts," 53 CoL. L. REv. 157 at 
160, n. 24 (1953). 
4128 U.S.C. (1952) §1349. See Mishkin, "The Federal 'Question' in the District 
Courts," 53 CoL. L. R.Ev. 157 at 160, n. 24 (1953). 
42 FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 272-273 (1928). 
43 Metcalf v. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888); Tennessee v. Union & Planter's Bank, 
152 U.S. 454 (1894); and Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 2ll U.S. 149 (1908). 
44 128 U.S. 586 (1888). 
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tion was present in the record · was there only because of the 
nature of the defense and the plaintiff's rebuttal thereto. The 
plaintiff's claim, the Court pointed out, was based on nothing 
more than an ordinary right of property, and if the defendant 
had failed to answer, the record would then have been barren 
of any suggestion of a federal question. In Tennessee v. Union 
Plante-rs Bank45 and Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mott-
ley46 the holding in Metcalf v. Watertown was extended to cases 
where the federal question was present only because of the plain-
tiff's anticipation of a defense or the defendant's petition for 
removal to a federal court.47 
The qualifications with which the Court had by this time 
surrounded the "federal question" concept,48 apparently in an 
effort to close the floodgate of litigation which the literal applica-
tion of that doctrine would otherwise have opened wide, had 
45 152 U.S. 454 (1894). In this case the State of Tennessee had, in one instance, filed 
a bill in equity in the circuit court of the United States to recover taxes allegedly due 
to the state from the defendant bank. The complaint expressly alleged that the case 
arose under the Constitution of the United States because the defendant contended that 
the tax was unconstitutional, thus raising the federal question in the complaint by 
anticipation of a defense. The plaintiff had also simultaneously filed another bill in the 
state court seeking the same relief, which the defendant had attempted to remove to 
the United States circuit court. In this instance the defense of unconstitutionality had 
not been anticipated in the complaint but had -been raised by the defendant in its 
petition for removal. 
46 211 U.S. 149 (1908). The plaintiffs had here sued the defendant railroad for specific 
performance of an agreement under which the plaintiffs were entitled to free passes on 
the railroad. The complaint raised the federal question by anticipation of a defense, 
stating ,that the railroad was attempting to excuse its refusal to live up to its agreement 
on the ground that a subsequent Act of Congress had outlawed such passes. The plaintiffs 
argued that the act relied upon ,by the railroad did not have the effect claimed for it, 
but even if it did, the act unconstitutionally deprived the plaintiffs of their contract rights. 
47 See, also, Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 367 (1950). Upon the 
dismissal of Louisville &: Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, the plaintiffs filed suit again, this 
time in -the state court. In their second case the plaintiffs prevailed in both the state trial 
court and the state supreme court, and the railroad then appealed to the Supreme Court 
of the United States, where the Court assumed jurisdiction of the appeal. Louisville &: 
Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911). Thus, in ,this pair of cases was neatly 
illustrated the difference in scope between the constitutional and statutory provisions, 
for what was riot a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States for 
purposes of the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts was such a case for 
purposes of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 
48 The various qualifications, including those already discussed, are summarized in 
Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). But see note 64 infra. They represent 
a substantial gloss on Chief Justice Marshall's uncomplicated approach in Osborn v. 
Bank of United States, where it was said to be immaterial how the federal question was 
raised, or ~vhether it was ever raised at all, providing that there was a federal question 
potentially present in the case. See Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of 
Federal Questions," 90 UNIV. PA. L. R.Ev. 639 at 662 (1942). 
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the anomalous effect of making it virtually impossible to justify 
federal jurisdiction on the basis of a federal question. Not only 
was it necessary that the federal question be raised in the plain-
tiff's statement of his own case, without reference to the answer 
and unaided by anticipation of a defense, but there had to be 
a genuine and present controversy with respect thereto, upon 
which the outcome of the case depended.49 It is difficult to con-
ceive of a case in which it would be possible to determine, upon 
the basis of the plaintiff's statement of his cause of action alone, 
before the issues had been framed by the answer, precisely which 
questions would be in controversy and determinative of the 
outcome of the litigation.00 Hopkins v. Walker,51 a suit to remove 
a cloud on title to a placer mining claim which the plaintiff held 
under a United States patent, was thought by the Supreme Court 
to be one of those exceptional cases where the issue in controversy 
upon which the outcome depended could be determined by refer-
ence to the well-pleaded portions of the complaint alone. The 
plaintiff had alleged in her complaint that the defendant's certifi-
cations of location, which were a cloud on the plaintiff's title, 
had been acquired under a mistaken theory of the mining laws 
of the United States. In the conventional law suit, such an issue 
would be deemed to have been raised by anticipation of a defense, 
but because the plaintiff was required under good pleading prac-
tice to allege the invalidity of the defendant's title as part of 
her cause of action, 52 she had, it was said, avoided the objection 
that the federal question was raised in this fashion. 53 Until the 
case was actually at issue, however, it would be impossible to 
know for certain whether its outcome would "necessarily" turn 
on the alleged mistaken theory as to the construction of the mining 
49 See Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248 at 257 (1885); Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 
191 U.S. 184 at 190-191 (1903). 
50 See Mishkin, "The Federal 'Question' in the District Court," 153 CoL. L. REV. 
157 at 170 (1953); McGoon v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (D.C. N.D. 1913) 204 F. 998 at 1001. 
51244 U.S. 486 (1917). 
52 In a suit to remove a cloud on title, the plaintiff must allege, in addition to facts 
showing his title, facts showing the existence and invalidity of the instrument sought 
to be eliminated as a cloud upon his title. 
53 The special nature of Hopkins v. Walker is illustrated by Marshall v. Desert 
Properties Co., (9th Cir. 1939) 103 F. (2d) 551, cert. den. 308 U.S. 563 (1939), where in a 
suit to quiet title to mining rights derived under federal law, it was held that the lower 
federal court was without jurisdiction. The case was distinguished from Hopkins v. 
Walker on the technical ground ·that the latter case had been a case to remove a cloud 
on title, not a suit to quiet title. 
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laws of the United States. If the defendant were to base his defense 
upon a defect in the plaintiff's title not involving those laws or 
upon an issue of fact, rather than upon the ground anticipated 
in the complaint, there would then have been no genuine con-
troversy in the case with respect to the construction of federal 
law.54 Even Hopkins v. Walker, therefore, did not possess the 
qualifications for federal jurisdiction which the Court had out-
lined in its previous decisions. 
III. The Difference, for Purposes of the Jurisdictional 
Statute, Between a "Question" and a "Case" Arising 
Under the Constitution or Laws of the United States 
Metcalf v. Watertown, Tennessee v. Union & Planter's Bank 
and Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley55 are primarily 
significant, not because they illustrate a difference only in degree 
in the scope which the Court had accorded to the constitutional 
and the statutory provisions but, because they suggest that the 
Court, although still paying lip-service to the "federal question" 
criterion, was really in the process of abandoning that doctrine 
and evolving an entirely different approach to the jurisdictional 
statute. In those cases the Court placed meaningful emphasis on 
the source of the plaintiff's cause of action, that is, whether the 
right relied upon by the plaintiff was one created by state law 
or by federal law and, because in each instance it was a right 
created by state law, the Court seems to conclude that the lower 
federal courts could not have original jurisdiction, although the 
outcome in each case might turn on the determination of one or 
more federal questions.56 
54 See discussion in text at notes 32-34 supra. Moreover, although the complaint in 
Hopkins v. Walker contained the allegation that the defendant's certifications of location 
had been acquired under a mistaken theory as to the mining laws of the United States, 
the plaintiff's cause of action did not stem from those laws but from the law of property 
providing for the vindication of clouded titles, which was a local cause of action, created 
-by state law. The decision appears to disregard the long line of cases holding that 
although mining rights may have originally been obtained by grant from the United 
States, suits to vindicate those rights arise under state law. See quotation from Shoshone 
v. Rutter in note 35 supra. In each of the four cases cited by the Court in support of 
federal jurisdiction in Hopkins v. Walker, the actual holding was against such jurisdic-
tion: Boston &: Montana Consolidated Copper v. Montana Ore Purchase Co., 188 U.S. 
632 (1903); Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912); Denver v. New York Trust Co., 
229 U.S. 123 (1913); Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74 (1914). 
55 See note 43 supra. 
56 In Tennessee v. Union & Planter's Bank, 152 U.S. 454 at 464 (1894), the Court said: 
"[T]he only right claimed ·by .the plaintiff is under the law of Tennessee, and they assert 
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If the Court really meant what it appears to be saying in those 
cases-that, for purposes of the jurisdictional statute, a case arising 
under the Constitution or laws of the United States is a case stating 
a cause of action created by federal law-then the inquiry into 
whether there was federal jurisdiction could always be answered 
by whether the plaintiff had pleaded a cause of action under 
federal law. Only by giving those cases such a reading can one 
ascribe any plausibility to the requirement that the element upon 
which federal jurisdiction depends must appear in the well-
pleaded portions of the complaint and must be determinative of 
the outcome of the case. If the Court was still thinking in terms 
of Chief Justice Marshall's "federal question" criterion-will the 
correct decision of the case depend upon the construction of some 
provision of the Constitution or laws of the United States-the 
determination of whether there was federal jurisdiction could 
never be made by reference to the well-pleaded allegations of the 
complaint alone.57 If, on the other hand, the Court was now 
thinking in terms of a federal cause of action as the necessary 
predicate for federal jurisdiction under the Act of 1875, then 
routine, good-pleading practice would always demand that the 
complaint contain within its four corners, without reference to 
or reliance upon a responsive pleading, the allegations essential 
to establish that predicate. If the plaintiff had properly pleaded 
a federal cause of action, the outcome of the case would then 
naturally depend upon whether the plaintiff had or had not 
sustained his right to relief under federal law. The element neces-
sary to federal jurisdiction would, therefore, always appear in 
the well-pleaded portions of the complaint and would always be 
determinative of the outcome of the litigation. 
This implied equating, for purposes of the jurisdictional 
statute, of a case arising under the Constitution or laws of the 
no right whatever under the Constitution and laws of the United States." And in Louis• 
ville &: Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 at 152 (1908): "[A] suit arises under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States only when the plaintiff's statement of his 
own cause of action shows that it is based upon those laws or that Constitution. It is not 
enough that the plaintiff alleges some anticipated defense to his cause of action and 
asserts that the defense is invalidated by some provision of the Constitution of the 
United States. Although such allegations show that very likely, in the course of the 
litigation, a question under the Constitution would arise, they do not show that the 
suit, that is the plaintiff's original cause of action, arises under the Constitution." 
57 See discussion in text at notes 47.54 supra. 
850 MICHIGAN LAw REvrnw [ Vol. 57 
United States with a case stating a federal cause of action was 
finally made articulate by Justice Holmes in American Well 
Works Co. v. Layne i/:t Bowler Co./8 which was an action for 
damages for alleged slander of the plaintiff's rights in a certain 
pump. The slander was said to have consisted of statements by 
the defendants that the plaintiff's pump infringed a United States 
patent held by the defendants, and the Court had to decide 
whether the case arose under the patent laws of the United 
States. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, pointed 
out that the plaintiff's claim was for damages for slander, a right 
created under state law, and the case, accordingly, had to arise 
under state law, and not the patent laws of the United States, 
even though the defendants' justification of the truth of their 
statements might involve questions of the validity and infringe-
ment of a United States patent. "A suit," he said, "arises under 
the law that creates the cause of action." If the state had seen 
fit to do away with a cause of action for slander of title, Justice 
Holmes continued, no one would suppose that the plaintiff could 
still purport to bring his action under the patent laws of the 
United States. The patent laws, although particularly providing 
for an action to test the validity of patents, to recover damages 
for their infringement and to enjoin their wrongful use, make no 
provision whatsoever for an action for slander of title.59 
58241 U.S. 257 (1916). Although this case technically involved only the question of 
when a suit arises under -the patent laws of the United States, within the scope of 28 
U.S.C. (1952) §1338 (conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the lower federal courts over 
all cases arising under the patent and copyright laws of the United States), the problem 
was in all respects analogous to. when a suit arises under the laws of the United States, 
generally, within the scope of the jurisdictional statute, and in Smith v. Kansas City 
Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921), discussed in text at notes 60-62 infra, Justice Holmes 
recognized the applicability to the jurisdictional statute of the analysis in American Well 
Works v. Layne & Bowler Co. · 
59 In Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., 168 U.S. 255 (1897), a similar analysis had 
earlier been made for purposes of determining whether a state court could dispose of 
a case involving a patent question. There, the Court spoke of the difference between a 
case arising under the patent laws of the United States and between questions arising 
under -those laws. The Court explained that it was only when the claim itself arose 
under the patent laws of the United States in the sense that it was created by those laws 
that the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction; othenvise, the state courts were free 
to decide patent questions which arose as an incidence of litigation based upon state-
created contract and property rights. See note, 31 CoL. L. REv. 461 (1931). 
Compare The Fair v. Kohler Dye & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913), where the 
plaintiff asserted the right to recover for an infringement of a patent, as expressly 
provided for in the patent laws. There, the Com,t, in a decision also written by Justice 
Holmes, held that where the cause of action was one for relief from an alleged infringe-
ment, such a suit did arise under the patent laws of the United States. Unlike American 
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Notwithstanding that the Court now appeared to have pene-
trated some of the confusion engendered by the early and long-
standing application to the jurisdictional statute of Chief Justice 
Marshall's broad pronouncements with respect to Article III 
of the Constitution, the "federal question" approach to the juris-
dictional statute had become too deeply rooted in usage not to 
expect it to cause further difficulty, as it, in fact, did in the very 
next decision of the Court on this subject. In Smith v. Kansas 
City Title & Trust Co.60 the plaintiff had sought to enjoin the 
defendant corporation, its officers, agents and employees from 
investing the funds of the corporation in farm loan bonds issued 
by federal land banks on the ground that the act authorizing the 
issue of such bonds was unconstitutional and that, accordingly, 
the imminent investment in such bonds by the corporation would 
be an investment in an unlawful security. Apparently overlooking 
the intervening development of the law and reaching, instead, 
straight back to Cohens v. Virginia and Osborn v. Bank of United 
States, the Court held that there was federal jurisdiction because of 
the necessity to decide the constitutional question. In a somewhat 
testy dissent, Justice Holmes, relying upon his earlier analysis in 
American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.,61 pointed out 
that the plaintiff's cause of action had been created by the corpor-
ation law of the State of Missouri, and the case, therefore, had 
to arise under Missouri law and not under the laws of the United 
States. It was only because Missouri law made it improper for a 
corporation to invest in bonds which were issued contrary to the 
Constitution of the United States, he explained, that it became 
at all material to decide the constitutional question. As long, 
Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., where the question of infringement was only 
incidental to a state-created cause of action for slander of title, the claim in The Fair v. 
Kohler Dye & Specialty Co. was made pursuant to the federally-created remedy for 
patent infringement, and the Court held -that the jurisdiction conferred upon the 
federal courts by the allegations of patent infringement in the complaint could not be 
destroyed by any defense or denial interposed ·by the defendant. As long.as the complaint 
had set forth a substantial (i.e., a non-frivolous) claim under the patent laws, all that 
such a defense or denial, could do was to raise an issue as to whether the plaintiff had 
made out a good cause of action, an issue which went to the merits of the case and not 
to the jurisdiction of the Court. Unsuccessful, as well as successful, cases may be brought 
under the patent laws, Justice Holmes declared, if it is, in fact, the patent laws upon 
which the plaintiff bases his claim. See further discussion of The Fair v. Kohler Dye & 
Specialty Co. in text at notes 81-86 infra. 
60 255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
61 See discussion in text at notes 58-59 supra. 
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however, as the cause of. action upon which the plaintiff relied 
was created by state law, federal jurisdiction could not be pred-
icated on the fact that the outcome of the case depended upon 
the determination of one or more incidental federal questions. 
It is the "suit," he said, "not a question in the suit, that must 
arise under the law of the United States." 
The rationale of Justice Holmes' dissent in Smith v. Kansas 
City Title & Trust Co. was adopted by a unanimous Court in 
Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,62 where the plaintiff had based its 
claim of federal jurisdiction upon an act of Congress authorizing 
the Treasurer of Puerto Rico to enforce the collection of a ter-
ritorial tax "by a suit at law instead of by attachment, embargo, 
distraint or any other form of summary administrative pro-
ceeding." The plaintiff argued that since its authority to sue for 
the tax had been conferred by an act of Congress, the case was 
one arising under the laws of the United States. The Supreme 
Court rejected this contention, pointing out that Congress had 
merely authorized the territorial government to sue, but that the 
claim itself, based upon the right to collect and the duty to pay 
the tax in question, had been created by the Puerto Rican legis-
lature. The Court said (at 483): 
"Federal jurisdiction may be invoked to vindicate a right 
or privilege created under a federal statute. It may not be 
invoked where the right asserted is nonfederal, merely be-
cause the plaintiff's right to sue is derived from federal law, 
or because the property involved was obtained under federal 
statute. The federal nature of the right to be established is 
decisive-not the source of the authority to establish it." 
The test announced in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co. was shortly 
thereafter followed in Gully v. First National Bank,63 where the 
62 288 U.S. 476 (1933). Although no express reference was made to Smith v. Kansas 
City Title & Trust Co., the Court did refer (at 483-484) with approval to McGoon v. 
Northern Pacific Ry. Co., (D.C. N.D. 1913) 204 F. 998 at 1001, 1005, where the district 
judge had anticipated the view expressed by Justice Holmes in Smith v. Kansas City 
Title & Trust Co. 
63 299 U.S. 109 (1936). The tax collector for the State of Mississippi was suing a 
national bank to recover a money judgment on the latter's undertaking to assume the 
debts of, another national bank. The plaintiff alleged ,that among the debts and liabil-
ities so assumed were ·the monies owing by the other national bank for state taxes. The 
case had ·been commenced in the state court, and the defendant had sought to remove 
it ,to the United States district court on the ground that -the plaintiff's claim-involving 
the right to tax a national bank-had its origin in a federal statute permitting such 
taxation, for in the absence of such a statute, the state would have •been prohibited 
under the Constitution from taxing a national bank. The Court pointed out that not-
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Court reiterated: "The federal nature of the right to be established 
is decisive."64 
The foregoing test for the original jurisdiction of the lower 
federal courts in non-diversity matters, as announced in Puerto 
Rico v. Russell & Co. and Gully v. First National Bank, cannot 
be reconciled with Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.65 
Although the latter case involved a constitutional question, the 
cause of action asserted by the plaintiff was one created by state 
law-the right of a stockholder of a corporation to enjoin the 
corporation and its officers from doing an act unlawful under 
the law of the domiciliary state. The dominant trend of the 
cases through Gully v. First National Bank, however, makes clear 
that it is never enough, for purposes of the jurisdictional statute 
(as contrasted with Article III of the Constitution), that a case 
involves one or more incidental questions arising under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, if the plaintiff's cause 
of action itself was pot created by federal law.66 
withstanding this origin in federal law, the cause of action upon which the plaintiff 
was actually suing was one sounding in contract, the right to recover upon the promise 
of one bank to assume the obligations of another, a right which was created by and 
arose under state law. "Not every question of federal law emerging in a suit," the Court 
explained, "is proof that a federal law is the basis of the suit." 
64 With his characteristic scholarliness, Justice Cardozo, in Gully v. First National 
Bank, canvassed the earlier cases, with ,their disparate results, in a futile attempt to 
distill some coherence out of them. Unfortunately, he seems to have misread the first 
nvo cases with which he began his review. He cited Starin v. New York, 115 U.S. 248 
at 257 (1885), and First National Bank v. Williams, 252 U.S. 504 at 512 (1920), for the 
proposition that in order to bring a case within 1:he jurisdictional statute, the plaintiff 
had to claim a right created ,by federal law. Although that proposition was developed 
in the later Supreme Court cases, the thinking in Starin v. New York and First National 
Bank v. Williams came undiluted out of Cohens v. Virginia and Osborn v. Bank of 
United States. In Starin v. New York, for example, the Court declared: "The character 
of a case is determined by the questions involved [citing Osborn v. Bank of United 
States]. If from the questions it appears that some title, right, privilege or immunity, on 
which the recovery depends, will be defeated by one construction of the Constitution 
or a law of the United States, or sustained by the opposite construction, the case will be 
one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, within the meaning of 
that term as used in the Act of 1875 ..• [citing Cohens v. Virginia].'' 
And the language in First National Bank v. Williams is almost identical. Thus, 
although Justice Cardozo was swimming with the contemporary current in stressing that 
federal jurisdiction depended upon the federal nature of the right to be established, 
his choice of authorities was unfortunate, and this may explain the puzzling fact that 
his decision was later incorrectly cited by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 
678 at 685 (1946), as authority for the most dubious kind of "federal question" jurisdic-
tion. See note 88 infra and discussion in text at notes 87-94. 
65 See discussion in text at notes 59-61 supra. 
66 Cf • .Mishkin, "The Federal 'Question' in the District Courts," 53 CoL. L. R.Ev. 157 
at 170-171 (1953). 
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Conceptual Coup de Grace 
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Although the Supreme Court now appeared to have discarded 
the "federal question" criterion in favor of a "federal cause of 
action" criterion, it was not until Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins67 
that the Court delivered what should have been the conceptual 
coup de grace to the notion that the presence of a federal question 
alone was sufficient to support the jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts in non-diversity cases. In the course of clarifying the manner 
in which the federal courts find and apply the pertinent law in 
diversity cases, the Court declared that the rights sought to be 
enforced in any lawsuit must have been created by some govern-
mental authority, either state or federal, for there was no trans-
cendental body of law existing independently of such govern-
mental authority. 68 From this proposition, it should follow that 
in each case one ought to be able to trace the plaintiff's cause 
of action back to the particular governmental authority creating 
it, and a case ought to arise, for purposes of the jurisdictional 
statute, only under the law of the government by whose authority 
the cause of action was created. This is precisely the result which 
the Court had already reached,69 without benefit of the con-
ceptual reinforcement provided in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins. 
Moreover, because the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tomp-
kins also declared that there was no federal general common 
law,70 it would seem to follow that a plaintiff's cause of action 
can never be said to have been created by federal law (and, thereby, 
67 304 U.S. 64 at 78-80 (1938). 
68 The Court here quoted with approval from Justice Holmes' earlier dissenting 
opinions in Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349 at 370-372 (1910), and Black and 
White Taxi Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxi Co., 276 U.S. 518 at 532-533 (1928), and it was 
more than mere coincidence that the Court finally came to follow Justice Holmes in the 
latter two dissenting opinions, as well as in his dissenting opinion in Smith v. Kansas 
City Title & Trust Co. (see discussion in text at notes 60-62 supra), for these three 
dissenting opinions reflect a consistent conceptual orientation (see discussion in text im-
mediately following this note). 
69 See discussion in text at notes 58-59, 62-66 supra. 
70 See, also, Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. (38 U.S.) 591 at 658 (1834): "It is clear, 
there can -be no common law of the United States. The federal government is composed 
of •twenty-four sovereign and independent states; each of ~vhich may have its local 
usages, customs and common law. There is no principle which pervades the Union and 
has the _authority of law, that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of the Union." 
In a note in 59 HARV. L. REv. 966 (1946), cases apparently contradicting the declara-
tions in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins that there is no federal general common law are 
discussed. However, federal common law is applied.in those cases to facilitate the enforce-
ment of rights which have been created by and to effectuate :the policies of express 
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to arise under federal law within the sense of the jurisdictional 
statute) unless it has been sanctioned by some express federal 
statutory or constitutionaF1 provision. Read by itself, therefore, 
the jurisdictional statute would seem to be an empty shell, for it 
is only when there is another federal statute creating the particular 
right72 sought to be enforced that the plaintiff's case does, in fact, 
arise under federal law. In order to determine, therefore, whether 
a case arises under federal law, in the sense that the plaintiff's 
cause of action has been created by federal law, the jurisdictional 
statute must be read in conjunction with the express federal 
right under which the plaintiff is claiming, and the two statutory 
provisions together then constitute the statutory predicate upon 
which federal jurisdiction must rest.73 This dependence of the 
jurisdictional statute upon an express federal cause of action is 
a reciprocal one, of course, in the sense that federal jurisdiction 
could not be predicated on such a right alone. The jurisdiction 
federal statutory or constitutional provisions. In other words, whatever federal common 
law does exist is incidental to and implicit in a federal right which has been expressly 
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States, ,but there is no federal common 
law which can itself be the source of such a right, as it can in those states which have 
adopted common law causes of action. 
71 Although the federal courts have traditionally granted equity relief against 
threatened violations of the Constitution and laws of the United States by state and 
federal officers and agencies, the authority for such jurisdiction is derived from a tradition 
antedating the Act of 1875 [Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 203 (1873); cf. Board of 
Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 at 534 (1875)] and independent thereof [American 
School v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902); Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida, 
284 U.S. 498 (1932); cf. Maule Industries v. Tomlinson, (5th Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 897 at 
899; Bell v. Hood, (S.D. Cal. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 813 at 818-819]. It is doubtful, however, 
whether the Constitution itself creates any private rights against individuals which can 
be enforced in an action at law in the federal courts, without some additional statutory 
implementation. See discussion in text at notes 76-94 infra. 
72 The following private causes of action, among others, have been expressly sanc-
tioned by federal law: 15 U.S.C. (1952) §15 (for violations of antitrust laws); 15 U.S.C. 
(1952) §§78i(e), 78p(b), 78r(a) and 78aa (for violations of Securities ·Exchange Act); 15 
U.S.C. (1952) §1114 et seq. (for infringement and other trademark violations); 17 U.S.C. 
(1952) §101 et seq. (for infringement and other copyright violations); 26 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 
1958) §§6532(a)(l) and 7422(a) and (b) (for recovery from collectors of internal revenue, 
individually, of taxes illegally assessed or collected) [See Plumb, "Tax Refund Suits 
Against Collectors of Internal Revenue," 60 HARv. L. REv. 685 at 690-691 (1947).]; 28 
U.S.C. (1952) §§2674 and 1346(b) (for torts of United States); 29 U.S.C. (1952) §§185 and 
187 (for violations of labor laws); 35 U.S.C. (1952) §281 et seq. (for infringement and 
other patent violations); 38 U.S.C. (1952) §445 (for recovery of insurance benefits by 
veterans); 40 U.S.C. (1952) §270b (for recovery on bonds of public works contractors); 42 
U.S.C. (1952) §§1983 and 1985 (for deprivations of civil rights under color of state law); 
45 U.S.C. (1952) §§51 and 56 (for injuries suffered by employees of interstate railroads); 
and 49 U.S.C. (1952) §20(11) (for items lost or damaged by common carriers in interstate 
shipments). 
73 See notes 83-84 infra. 
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of the lower federal courts is purely statutory and, unless Congress 
had provided a federal forum for the enforcement of federally 
created rights, the plaintiff would have to rely upon the state 
courts to enforce them.74 Such a possibility, however, is now 
obviated by the jurisdictional statute, since it serves as a catch-all 
jurisdictional provision, automatically assuring a federal forum 
for every case in which Congress has created a cause of action 
but has not otherwise provided for a remedy in the federal courts. 75 
74 See authorities cited in note 3 supra and discussion in text at note 14 supra. 
75 For most of the federal statutory causes of action listed in note 72 supra, Congress 
made specific provision for a remedy in the federal courts, aside and apart from the 
jurisdictional statute. However, in •the case of private claims against common carriers for 
items lost or damaged in interstate shipments [49 U.S.C. (1952) §20(11)], for example, no 
such specific provision for remedy in the federal courts was made, and the Supreme Court 
was, accordingly, obliged in Peyton v. Railway Express Agency, 316 U.S. 350 (1942), to 
read 49 U.S.C. §20(11) in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. §1337 [formerly 28 U.S.C. §41(8)], 
providing generally for federal jurisdiction over suits arising under acts of Congress 
regulating commerce. Similarly, no specific provision for a remedy in the federal courts 
is made for the federal statutory causes of action for infringement and other violations 
of the patent [35 U.S.C. (1952) §281 et seq.] and copyright [17 U.S.C. (1952) §IOI et seq.] 
laws, for recovery from collectors of internal revenue, individually, of taxes illegally 
assessed or collected [26 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §§6532(a)(I) and 7422(a)] or for depriva-
tions of civil rights under color of state law [42 U.S.C. (1952) §§1983 and 1985]. Accord-
ingly, in order ,to afford a remedy in the federal courts for persons asserting claims under 
the latter statutes, the respective statutory causes of action must be read in conjunction 
with 28 U.S.C. §1338 (providing generally for federal jurisdiction over cases arising under 
the patent, copyright and trademark laws of ,the United States), 28 U.S.C. §1340 (provid-
ing generally for federal jurisdiction over cases arising under the internal revenue laws 
of the United States) or 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §1343 (providing generally for federal 
jurisdiction over cases arising under the civil rights laws of the United States). It would, 
to be sure, be just as appropriate to read each of the federal statutory causes of action 
for which no specific provision for a remedy in the federal courts has been made in 
conjunction with the jurisdictional statute (providing for federal jurisdiction over cases 
arising under the laws of the United States, generally), as it is to read it in conjunction 
with ,the corresponding special provision for federal jurisdiction over cases arising under 
a certain class of laws, except that the special jurisdictional provisions have been con-
strued as not requiring the minimum amount in controversy which is necessary when 
federal jurisdiction is predicated on the jurisdictional statute. Peyton v. Railway Express 
Agency, 316 U.S. 350 (1942). 
Peyton v. Railway Express Agency illustrates both sides of the jurisdictional coin, 
for it is manifest in that case that jurisdiction could not have been predicated on 28 
U.S.C. §1337 alone and that without the express rights created under 49 U.S.C. §20(11), 
the lower court would not have had the power ,to grant the relief sought. Similarly, 
although 28 U.S.C. §1338, 28 U.S.C. §1340 and 28 U.S.C. §1343 provide generally for 
jurisdiction over cases arising under the patent, copyright and trademark laws, the 
internal revenue laws and the civil rights laws of the United States, respectively, a 
private remedy in ,the federal courts cannot be predicated on those special jurisdictional 
provisions alone Gust as it cannot be predicated on the jurisdictional statute alone), but 
they must always be read in conjunction with the particular federal statutory causes of 
action, creating private rights under the respective classes of laws. Unless Congress had 
created such express rights under those laws, the lower federal courts would be without 
jurisdiction to afford relief to private litigants, notwithstanding that the outcome of the 
litigation might turn on the determination of one or more questions concerning such 
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In Bell v. H ood76 the Court was obliged to address itself 
directly to the question of whether the inference arising out of 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins was applicable to the jurisdictional 
statute, namely, whether a cause of action had to be expressly 
sanctioned by federal law in order to justify the original juris-
diction of the lower federal courts in non-diversity matters.77 
The plaintiffs in Bell v. Hood had brought suit in the United 
States district court against agents of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation for money damages for alleged unlawful arrests and 
illegal searches and seizures, in violation of the plaintiff's pur-
ported rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the 
Constitution of the United States.78 There was no diversity of 
citizenship, and the district court judge dismissed the case for 
want of federal jurisdiction. After the affi.rmance of the dismissal 
by the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 
The Court characterized the issue as "whether federal courts 
can grant money recovery for damages said to have been suffered 
as the result of federal officers violating the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments."79 That, the Court declared, is not a jurisdictional 
laws. Cf. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916), discussed 
in text at notes 58-59 supra. 
76 327 U.S. 678 (1946). 
77 This question had already been approached on several occasions by the United 
States courts of appeals in cases involving the right of private persons to recover damages 
for violations of or to enjoin violations of certain of the federal regulatory acts, such as 
the Securities Exchange Act and the Public Utility Holding Company Act, where no 
private remedy had been expressly authorized for the particular violations complained 
of. In at least two of those cases it was suggested that a private remedy did exist. 
Baird v. Franklin, (2d Cir. 1944) 141 F. (2d) 238, cert. den. 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Goldstein 
v. Groesbeck, (2d Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 422, cert. den. 323 U.S. 737 (1944); but see 
Downing v. Howard, (3d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 654; cf. note, 56 YALE L.J. 880 (1947). 
The courts in those cases, however, were not concerned with the particular issue of 
federal jurisdiction in non-diversity matters but, rather, with the more general problem 
of whether private relief could be predicated on the violation of regulatory legislation, 
where no express provision therefor has been made. Those cases, moreover, can be 
read as holding that the private remedy, although not expressly provided for in the 
act, was so implicit in the pattern of the legislation as to amount, for all practical 
purposes, to a statutory remedy. Cf. Philadelphia v. The Collector, 5 Wall. (72 U.S.) 720 
at 731 (1867); Plumb, "Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue,'' 60 
HARv. L. R.Ev. 685 at 690-691 (1947). 
78 The pertinent portion of the Fourth Amendment states: "The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated. . . ." And the Fifth Amendment: "No person 
shall .•. be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ...• " 
79 327 U.S. 678 at 684. Neither the Constitution nor any federal statute expressly 
provided such a private remedy against federal officers, although one is expressly provided 
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question, but goes to the merits of the plaintiffs' case, and it 
was error for the lower court to have dismissed the case on 
jurisdictional grounds. Although expressing its belief that the 
plaintiffs had stated a substantial claim for relief under federal 
law, the Court refrained from actually deciding whether a 
federal remedy was available but remanded the case to the dis-
trict court-for further proceedings.80 
The Court was under the mistaken impression that because 
the plaintiffs were seeking recovery "squarely on the ground that 
the respondents violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments," 
the lower court was compelled to assume jurisdiction under the 
for the deprivation of certain civil rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. (1952) §§1983 
and 1985, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §1343. 
so Upon remand to the district court, the case was once more dismissed. Bell v. 
Hood, (S.D. Cal. 1947) 71 F. Supp. 813. This time, however, in deference to the Supreme 
Court's instructions, the dismissal was said to be on the ground that the complaint had 
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, rather than upon the jurisdic-
tional ground. In an excellently reasoned opinion, the district court judge (Mathes, J .) 
analyzed the authorities upon which the Supreme Court had relied to support the 
substantiality of the federal claim asserted by the plaintiffs and concluded that the 
plaintiffs did not have a remedy against the defendants under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments. He pointed out that the prohibitions of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
apply only to the federal government, not to individuals, and provide no protection 
against individual misconduct. See Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 at 490 (1944): 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 at 398 (1914). If, in order to assimilate their claim 
to the rights created by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the action had been brought 
on the theory that the defendants had acted as agents of the federal government, within 
the scope of their duties, the plaintiffs would then have been barred by the sovereign 
immunity doctrine. See Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. (44 U.S.) 87 at 96-99 (1845). In any 
view of the case, .therefore, the Fourth and Fifth Amendments could not be the basis 
of a private action for damages against the defendants. See quotation from Johnston v. 
Earle, (9th Cir. 1957) 245 F. (2d) 793, in note 94 infra. 
Among the other authorities relied upon by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood in 
support of its conclusion that the plaintiffs had stated a substantial claim under the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments were the cases where equitable relief had been granted in 
the federal courts against threatened violations of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States by officers or agencies of the federal or state governments. The district 
court judge pointed out, however, the distinction between enjoining a threatened violation 
of federal law by an officer or agency of the federal or state governments and recognizing 
a private cause of action for money damages against individuals for injuries resulting 
from such a violation. See note 71 supra. 
The Supreme Court had also relied upon two earlier decisions in suits brought to 
recover damages for deprivation, under color of state law, of ·the right to vote. Wiley v. 
Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1901). The district 
court judge explained, however, that the plaintiffs in .those cases had the benefit of an 
act of Congress giving a private remedy for deprivation of voting rights under color 
of state law. 42 U.S.C. (1952) §1983, 28 U.S.C. (Supp. V. 1958) §1343. If particular statutory 
authorization was thought by Congress to be necessary to afford private relief in the 
federal courts against individuals for deprivation of civil ·rights covered by the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments, it should follow that such statutory authorization is also 
required to afford such relief for deprivation of the rights covered by the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments. 
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authority of The Fair v. Kohler Dye & Specialty Co.81 In The 
Fair v. Kohler Dye & Specialty Co., however, the plaintiff was 
suing for an alleged infringement of its patent, for which a cause of 
action had been particularly provided under the patent laws of 
the United States. The Court there carefully pointed out that 
since the theory of the plaintiff's case was that he was entitled 
to relief under a particular federal law and since there was no 
doubt that federal law did provide a private remedy for the 
type of injury claimed by the plaintiff, the only jurisdictional 
question which remained was whether the facts alleged in the 
complaint made out a substantial (i.e., a non-frivolous) claim 
under that particular law. If they did, the district court had 
jurisdiction to inquire into the matter on the merits.82 In Bell 
v. Hood, on the other hand, the very question to be determined, 
according to the Court's own analysis, was whether the plaintiffs 
had a right to relief under federal law for the type of in jury 
claimed by them. This is a question which goes to the power 
of the federal courts to give the relief sought83 and is the essence 
of a jurisdictional question.84 
In concluding that the district court had jurisdiction, the 
Court appears to have confused the setting forth of a substantial 
factual claim under an admitted federal remedy (which was the 
situation in The Fair v. Kohler Dye & Specialty Co.) with the 
making of a substantial legal argument in support of the existence 
81288 U.S. 22 (1913), discussed in note 59 supra. 
82See Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc., 263 U.S. 291 (1923), where the plaintiff had 
sued in the district court for damages for an alleged violation of the federal antitrust 
laws, a remedy which was expressly authorized in -that legislation. The lower court had 
dismissed the case, and the Supreme Court was required to decide whether it had been 
a dismissal on the merits or for jurisdictional reasons. The Court declared that where 
the cause of action is thus expressly authorized by act of Congress and the complaint 
sets forth a substantial claim under that statute, jurisdiction cannot -be made to stand 
or fall on the way the Court may chance to decide an issue as to the legal sufficiency 
of the facts alleged to support the claim. In both Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, Inc. 
and The Fair v. Kohler Dye & Specialty Co. there was no question as to whether a 
federal remedy existed for the type of injury claimed by the plaintiff, whereas that was 
precisely the question to be decided in Bell v. Hood. 
83 Because the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, their power to 
adjudicate and give relief must always ·be sought in some act of Congress. See authorities 
cited in note 3 supra. The jurisdictional statute authorizes the exercise of that power, 
in an abstract sense, over all causes of action created by the federal government, but 
whether the federal courts actually have that power in any specific instance depends 
upon whether there is a particular federal cause of action for the type of injury claimed 
by the plaintiff. See discussion in text at notes 70-75 supra. 
84 In Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 657 at 718 (1838), it was stated 
that a court has jurisdiction "if the law confers the power to render a judgment or 
decree." And in Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. (37 U.S.) 308 at 316 (1870): "By jurisdiction 
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of such. a remedy. Where there is no controversy as to the 
existence of a particular federal remedy, the rule in The Fair v. 
Kohler Dye & Specialty Co. is that the setting forth of a sub-
stantial factual claim under said remedy will confer jurisdiction 
on a federal court to inquire into the merits.85 But any inquiry 
into the merits presupposes that the court has the power to 
render the judgment or decree sought. The determination of 
whether there is such power is a question of law which lies at 
the threshold of all other controversies in the case and must be 
resolved by the Court before it can presume to dispose of the 
matter on its merits. Where the very dispute centers on whether 
a federal remedy exists, the fact that the plaintiffs may have 
made a creditable legal argument in favor of such a remedy 
can not confer jurisdiction if the correct view of the law is that 
no such remedy has been provided. 86 
The most curious aspect of the case, however, was the resur-
rection by the Supreme Court of the "federal question" concept, 
which, like Banquo's ghost, appears to be inexorcisable. With 
surprising unawareness of or indifference to the dominant trend 
of the later cases, 87 the Court reinforced its conclusion that the 
over the subject-matter is meant the nature of the cause of action and of the relief 
sought; and this is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court, and 
is to be sought for in the general nature of its powers, or in authority specially conferred." 
85 Compare Levering & Garrignes Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933), where federal 
jurisdiction was denied on the ground that tlle factual allegations of the complaint did 
not make out a substantial claim under the express remedy afforded by the federal 
antitrust laws. 
86 In his dissenting opinion (327 U.S. 678 at 685-686), Justice Stone succinctly pointed 
out the error into which the Court had fallen: "The district court is without jurisdiction 
as a federal court unless the complaint states a cause of action arising under the Consti-
tution or laws of the United States. Whether the complaint states such a cause of action 
is for the court, not the pleader, to say. When the provision of the Constitution or 
federal statute affords a remedy which may in some circumstances be availed of by a 
plaintiff, the fact that his pleading does not bring him within that class as one entitled 
to the remedy, goes to the sufficiency of the pleading and not the jurisdiction .... But 
where, as here, neither the constitutional provision nor any act of Congress affords a 
remedy to any person, the mere assertion by a plaintiff that he is entitled to such a 
remedy cannot be said to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. Hence we think that the 
courts below rightly decided that the district court was without jurisdiction because no 
cause of action under the Constitution or laws of the United States was stated." 
One of the effects of characterizing the dismissal as on the merits, rather than as 
jurisdictional, was also commented upon by Justice Stone in his dissenting opinion, 
where he pointed out that if the dismissal is not jurisdictional, the federal court may, 
under the doctrine of Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), be required to try a non-
federal claim, if the same facts alleged .by the plaintiff give rise to a cause of action 
under state law, such as trespass, for example. For further discussion of this problem, 
see note, 56 YALE L. J. 880 (1947). 
87 Bell v. Hood was described as a case in which the plaintiffs' legal rights had been 
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district court had jurisdiction over the matter by the alternative 
argument that the very inquiry into whether the plaintiffs had a 
cause of action under federal law in itself raised questions under 
the Constitution and l~ws of the United States sufficient to support 
the jurisdiction of the lower court on a conventional "federal 
question" basis.88 In effect, the Court seems to be saying that 
whenever a plaintiff claims a federal remedy and a substantial 
question is raised as to whether he does, in fact, have such a 
remedy, the mere assertion of such a claim is sufficient to justify 
federal jurisdiction. Inasmuch as the claim of a right to relief 
under federal law is synonymous with a claim of federal jurisdic-
tion and the inquiry into whether there is a federal cause of action 
is the real heart of the jurisdictional matter,89 the Court is thus 
sanctioning a species of "bootstrap" jurisdiction, in which juris-
diction may be predicated merely on the necessity to inquire 
into whether there is jurisdiction. Every court, of course, must 
have preliminary and tentative jurisdiction to determine whether 
it has jurisdiction over the subject matter, 90 but to say that 
the presence of a substantial question as to federal jurisdiction 
is alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a federal court is 
to render the jurisdictional standard illusory, for a standard 
which will always admit jurisdiction in every earnest test is 
no standard at all. This is the ultimate application of the 
"federal question" criterion, far exceeding the limits to which 
it had ever been extended before,91 and it graphically illustrates 
"ruthlessly violated" (see 327 U.S. 678 at 683) and may be another example of a hard 
case making bad law. 
88 The constitutional provisions about which the Court felt substantial questions had 
been raised were the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, and the statutory provision was 
28 U.S.C. (1952) §1331 (formerly 28 U.S.C. §41), which is the statutory successor of the 
Act of 1875. For authority, the Court relied on Gully v. First National Bank, which it 
erred in assessing (see note 64 supra and discussion in text there), and Smith v. Kansas 
City Title &: Trust Co., which, like the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases before it (see 
discussion in text at notes 36-42 supra), was a "sport" (see discussion in text at notes 
65-67 supra). 
89 See discussion in text at notes 70-86 supra. 
90 See In re National Labor Relations Board, 304 U.S. 486 at 494 (1938). 
91 Left unanswered in the opinion is this question, which immediately suggests 
itself: if the inquiry into federal law occasioned by Bell v. Hood was sufficient to support 
federal jurisdiction, why was not the similar inquiry occasioned by all of the earlier 
cases in which jurisdiction was denied [to name just two-Puerto Rico v. Russell &: Co., 
288 U.S. 476 (1933), discussed in text at note 62 supra, and Gully v. First National Bank, 
299 U.S. 109 (1936), discussed in text at note 63 supra] also sufficient? Certainly the issues 
in those cases were just as substantial, if the care which the Court took in those opinions 
to treat of them is any measure. 
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that plastic quality which has been its strength as a constitutional 
idea and its fatal weakness as a workable rule.92 
Bell v. Hood came at a critical stage in the development of 
the Supreme Court's thinking on the relationship between a 
federal question and the original jurisdiction of the lower federal 
courts in non-diversity matters. The later cases had gradually 
been abandoning the obscurantism of the "federal question" 
concept and evolving a more positive approach, in which a case 
was said to arise under federal law, for purposes of the jurisdic-
tional statute, only when the plaintiff was asserting a cause of 
action created by that law. Bell v. Hood was ideally suited as a 
vehicle for giving a definitive exposition of that approach, but 
the Court faltered in its analysis of the issues and refused to come 
to grips with the central question in the case-did the plaintiffs 
have a cause of action under federal law? Only Justice Stone in 
his dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Burton) picked up the 
thread of the thinking of the later cases and applied it logically 
to the facts.93 Unfortunately, it is fairly to be expected that until 
the majority opinion is clarified, this subject will continue to 
be a trap for the wary and the unwary, indiscriminately.94 
92 See discussion in text at notes 12-13 supra. 
93 See excenit from dissenting opinion of Justice Stone, in note 86 supra. 
94 See, for example, Fielding v. Allen, (2d Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 163, where Bell v. 
Hood was followed to support federal jurisdiction in a private action for violation of 
the Interstate Commerce Act, although no such remedy had been expressly provided 
therein, on the ground that the question of whether or not there had been a violation 
presented a federal question; Fratt v. Robinson, (9th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 627, where 
·Bell v. Hood was followed to support federal jurisdiction in a private action for violation 
of the Securities Exchange Act, altholl;gh no such remedy had been expressly provided 
therein, on the ground that the need to adjudicate whether such a remedy was available 
presented a federal question; Lowe v. Manhattan Beach School District, (9th Cir. 1955) 
222 F. (2d) 258, where Bell v. Hood was followed to support federal jurisdiction in a 
private action for damages against a state school board for having taken the plaintiff's 
property without due process of law, on the ground that the need to adjudicate whether 
such a remedy was available presented a federal question; but see Johnston v. Earle, 
(9th Cir. 1957) 245 F. (2d) 793, where federal jurisdiction -ivas denied in a private action 
for damages against the district director of internal revenue for alleged illegal seizure of 
plaintiff's property, where the Ninth Circuit (referring to Bell v. Hood) stated (at 796): 
"On its return to the district court,. that court, in a very able opinion by Judge 
Mathes, held that no federal cause of action existed for the acts of federal officials 
violating the Fourth· and Fifth Amendments. His reasoning is that the ·due process clause 
of the Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal government, and not to individuals. 
"In fine, the federal government has created no cause of action enforceable in its 
courts for such torts under the state law, and hence the district court here lacked jurisdic-
tion of the subject matter . 
. "Judgment is reversed, and the district court ordered to enter an order dismissing 
the action for failure to state a claim arising under the laws of the United States." 
